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ABSTRACT: The EU conducts its external relations through different types of tools, including through 
unilateral domestic measures with extraterritorial implications that extend its regulatory power to 
processes occurring partly abroad. These are increasingly prevalent in the area of environmental 
protection, including climate change. Examples include the sustainability criteria for biofuels, the 
inclusion of aviation emissions in the EU emissions trading system, ship recycling, exports of elec-
trical and electronic waste and imports of timber. Because these measures are unilateral in nature, 
developed within the EU legal order, but have important legal and policy effects beyond EU bor-
ders, they raise complex legitimacy questions and may give rise to an external accountability gap. 
The role of EU administrative law, which controls the exercise of EU public power, is important in 
“disciplining” the exercise of EU power beyond EU borders and filling this gap. The Article explores 
some of the novel regulatory techniques employed in these kinds of internal measures to conduct 
external action and how administrative law responds to their complexities. It focuses on access to 
justice in the EU legal order in exploring the extent of an external accountability gap. The con-
straints of accessing the EU judicial system may accentuate the external accountability gap if the 
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EU cannot be held into account on the basis of its own rule of law by third country actors affected 
by its action.  
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I. Introduction  
The EU pursues external action through different kinds of legal mechanisms and regula-
tory techniques, including unilateral measures that extend its regulatory power to pro-
cesses taking place abroad. These measures are proliferating in many EU policy areas, 
including financial services regulation1 and data protection law.2 The focus of this Article 
is on such measures as they become increasingly prevalent in the area of environmen-
tal protection and climate change. Examples of Internal Environmental Measures with Ex-
traterritorial Implications (IEMEIs) include the sustainability criteria for biofuels,3 the in-
clusion of aviation emissions in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS),4 regulation 
of ship recycling,5 exports of waste of electrical and electronic equipment,6 imports of 
timber,7 and imports of fish and fishery products.8 By their legal design, IEMEIs regulate 
conduct or processes taking place, at least partly, in third countries (TCs),9 and influence 
business practices and regulatory approaches abroad, thus having important impacts 
on different kinds of TC actors.10 IEMEIs reflect the extraterritorial reach of EU environ-
 
1 J. SCOTT, The New EU ‘Extraterritoriality’, in Common Market Law Review, 2014, p. 1343 et seq. 
2 C. KUNER, Extraterritoriality and Regulation of International Data Transfers in EU Data Protection Law, in 
International Data Privacy Law, 2015, p. 235 et seq. 
3 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promo-
tion of the use of energy from renewable sources (hereinafter, also Renewable Energy Directive).  
4 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community (hereinafter, also Aviation Directive).  
5 Regulation (EU) 1257/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on 
ship recycling (hereinafter, also Ship Recycling Regulation).  
6 Directive 2012/19/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on waste electri-
cal and electronic equipment (WEEE; hereinafter, also Directive on electrical and electronic waste).  
7 Regulation (EU) 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying 
down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market (hereinafter, also 
Timber Regulation). 
8 Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 of the Council of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system 
to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU; hereinafter, also IUU 
Fishing Regulation). 
9 TCs are understood as non-EU countries.  
10 TC actors consist of non-EU public and private interests, including government, industry, civil soci-
ety and individual interests situated outside EU borders.  
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mental law and constitute an important manifestation of the exercise of EU global regu-
latory power.11 
In situations where cooperative regimes fail or are inadequate, the EU increasingly re-
sorts to IEMEIs, partly as a way of filling international regulatory gaps. However, the uni-
lateral exercise of global regulatory power through measures that originate in one legal 
order but affect actors and regimes beyond its borders may give rise to important ac-
countability questions. In the absence of state consent for their application to TCs, IEMEIs 
could create mistrust, as the EU could be perceived as outsourcing climate and environ-
mental responsibilities outside its territory and engaging in protectionism. IEMEIs can be 
particularly contentious because they often affect developing countries,12 such as ship re-
cycling and timber producing countries, which may lack the necessary resources and ca-
pacity to adapt to EU standards. Furthermore, IEMEIs give rise to global governance that 
involves “rule-making and power-exercise at a global scale, but not necessarily by entities 
authorised by general agreement to act”13 and can raise questions about controlling regu-
latory power exercised across and beyond established jurisdictional borders. IEMEIs can 
therefore be problematic because regulatory standards are extended to TC actors that do 
not usually have a voice in the formulation and implementation of decisions that affect 
them. Also, the EU is usually not under an obligation to justify and explain its action in re-
lation to TC effects. Therefore, in accordance with Mark Bovens’ definition of accountabil-
ity,14 there is no clear relationship between the EU institutions in exercising regulatory 
power through IEMEIs and TC affected interests as a relevant forum for holding EU actors 
to account.15 This can lead to exercise of power without accountability or representation 
of affected interests situated outside the EU as the regulating jurisdiction,16 thus creating 
an external accountability gap.17 As Benvenisti argues, when sovereigns legislate for hu-
manity rather than solely for domestic stakeholders, they should be subject to obligations 
to take into account foreign interests of affected stakeholders.18 While the logic of “power 
brings responsibility” may justify IEMEIs in terms of the EU instigating environmental regu-
 
11 J. SCOTT, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, in American Journal of Comparative Law, 
2014, p. 87 et seq. 
12 The term developing countries includes countries at different stages of development, including less 
developed, developing and least developed countries, depending on the countries affected by each IEMEI.  
13 R.O. KEOHANE, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in D. HELD, M. KOENIG-ARCHIBUGI 
(eds), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, p. 132. 
14 M. BOVENS, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, in European Law Journal, 
2007, p. 447 et seq. 
15 See M. CREMONA, P. LEINO, Introduction: The New Frontiers of EU Administrative Law and the Scope of 
our Inquiry, in European Papers, 2017, Vol. 2, No. 2, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 467 et seq. 
16 G. DAVIES, International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitutionalism: A Perspective from 
Constitutional Pluralism, in German Law Journal, 2013, p. 1203 et seq.  
17 R.O. KEOHANE, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, cit., pp. 139-142. 
18 E. BENVENISTI, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign 
Stakeholders, in American Journal of International Law, 2013, p. 295 et seq. 
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latory changes in TCs, EU global regulatory power should be disciplined and held to ac-
count in relation to TC effects in order to “guard against abuse”.19 
On the basis of this background and in light of uncertain accountability relation-
ships between the EU as a regulating jurisdiction and foreign interests affected by its 
domestic legislation, this Article explores the extent to which EU administrative law con-
tributes to filling an accountability gap related to IEMEIs. In governing and controlling 
the exercise of global regulatory power through IEMEIs, EU law can play a dual role. On 
the one hand, EU law can enable the adoption of IEMEIs by providing the legal basis for 
the EU to act, particularly through broad interpretation of competences. On the other 
hand, EU law can constrain the exercise of EU global regulatory power by holding it to 
account in relation to TC effects. Enabling IEMEIs without sufficiently disciplining the ex-
ercise of EU regulatory power can exacerbate an external accountability gap. In this re-
spect, EU administrative law, which controls the exercise of public power, may provide 
mechanisms that protect the rights and interests of those affected by EU regulatory 
power, including those situated outside the EU, and thereby create transnational ac-
countability avenues. There are different mechanisms through which an accountability 
gap could be filled in this context, including through participation rights in the formula-
tion of IEMEIs, due process rights, transparency, as well as judicial review. This Article 
examines judicial review as a promising mechanism for enforcing legal accountability20 
and disciplining the exercise of EU global regulatory power through IEMEIs.  
The Article first explores novel regulatory techniques in various examples of IEMEIs, 
which provide unique challenges for EU administrative law in controlling EU regulatory 
power, and demonstrates how the distinction between internal and external EU action 
is often blurred (section II). In evaluating the extent of an accountability gap in relation 
to IEMEIs, the Article examines judicial review of IEMEIs and related acts in the EU legal 
order as a transnational accountability avenue for TC affected actors, particularly focus-
ing on access to justice hurdles faced by TC applicants in the EU judicial system (section 
III). While this is done in the context of the extraterritorial reach of EU environmental 
law, some aspects of the analysis are also relevant more broadly for the inquiry of this 
Special Issue into the existence of an accountability gap in EU external relations, and for 
other policy areas where the extraterritorial reach of EU law is evident.  
II. The legal phenomenon of IEMEIs 
The global reach of EU environmental law is increasingly prevalent in IEMEIs, which 
manifest “territorial extension”, whereby the application of EU legislation takes into ac-
 
19 J. SCOTT, The Geographical Scope of the EU’s Climate Responsibilities, in Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, 2015, p. 92 et seq. 
20 On the different types of accountability see M. CREMONA, P. LEINO, Introduction: The New Frontiers of 
EU Administrative Law and the Scope of our Inquiry, cit., p. 467 et seq. 
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count, as a matter of law, conduct or circumstances taking place abroad.21 This section 
sets out several legal features of IEMEIs in regulating access to the EU market, with the 
aim of demonstrating their extraterritorial character, as well as showing how different 
kinds of TC actors come within the scope of application of EU law in different ways. This 
discussion also draws attention to the kinds of acts involved in the implementation of IE-
MEIs to TC actors, on the basis of which judicial challenges may be brought. The analysis 
explores three features of IEMEIs relating to their transnational functioning: 1) how IEMEIs 
“regulate” conduct abroad through environmental regulatory requirements; 2) how these 
requirements are used as market access conditions in the form of direct or indirect obli-
gations on TC actors; and 3) how IEMEIs link compliance to developments abroad.  
ii.1. IEMEIs regulating conduct abroad on the basis of environmental 
regulatory requirements 
The legal design of IEMEIs in regulating conduct that partly takes place abroad operates 
in at least two ways. First, certain IEMEIs regulate conduct abroad by conditioning ac-
cess to the EU market on the basis of how production or waste treatment processes 
take place in TCs. Such examples include the sustainability criteria for biofuels, the re-
quirements for environmentally sound ship recycling, the regulation of imports of tim-
ber, the exports of electrical waste and regulation of illegal, unregulated and unreport-
ed (IUU) fishing. “Regulating” conduct abroad on the basis of process standards does 
not necessarily entail exporting EU-set standards, but also covers situations where the 
EU indirectly asserts regulatory power over processes abroad. For example, while the 
EU Timber Regulation requires that only legally harvested timber can enter the EU mar-
ket, it regulates market access by reference to legality standards of the country of 
origin.22 Also, certain IEMEIs impose restrictions on processes abroad on the basis of TC 
and international law. For example, the IUU Fishing Regulation requires fishing activi-
ties, which result in fishery products exported to the EU, wherever these may occur, to 
be carried out in accordance with legality requirements of the flag state of the fishing 
vessel and in accordance with international standards on conservation and manage-
ment.23 Second, beyond process standards, other IEMEIs “regulate” conduct abroad by 
attaching economic incentive obligations to such conduct. For example, the inclusion of 
flights departing from or arriving at EU airports in the EU ETS initially required airlines to 
surrender ETS allowances on the basis of their entire journey, including those parts tak-
ing place outside EU borders.24 
 
21 J. SCOTT, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, cit., p. 87 et seq.  
22 Regulation 995/2010, cit.  
23 Arts 2, para. 2, let. a), and 12, para. 3, of Regulation 1005/2008, cit. 
24 Directive 2008/101, cit. 
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Notably, “regulating” processes abroad through IEMEIs does not mean that the EU 
imposes restrictions on how conduct takes place abroad even when not accessing the 
EU market.25 Nonetheless, the effects of such EU market-related measures can be far-
reaching in practice. Through “unilateral regulatory globalisation”, the EU is sometimes 
able to “externalize its laws and regulations outside its borders”, giving rise to a “Brus-
sels effect”.26 EU market-related measures create incentives for non-EU economic oper-
ators to comply with EU standards when trading with the EU, which may lead to chang-
es in business practices more generally. Foreign companies may change their business 
practices to match EU regulatory standards across their entire production, irrespective 
of their ultimate market (“de facto Brussels effect”).27 In turn, domestic industry may 
urge TC governments to change their regulatory policies to be similar to those of the 
EU, thus leading to formal changes in TC domestic law (“de jure Brussels effect”).28 
Through different kinds of market mechanisms, the EU uses its market power as lever-
age for compliance and regulatory change beyond its borders.29  
ii.2. IEMEIs regulating trade: market access conditions and obligations 
on Third Country actors 
In regulating trade, environmental regulatory requirements in IEMEIs function as mar-
ket access conditions in different ways. As demonstrated through various examples in 
this section, IEMEIs are legally designed either as mandatory conditions or as partial re-
strictions to the EU market, and impose different kinds of obligations on foreign actors, 
either directly or indirectly. The ways in which market access restrictions apply to TC ac-
tors ultimately determines their legal position in the EU legal order, including whether 
they have access to EU courts, as discussed in section III. 
IEMEI standards are often designed as mandatory conditions for access to the EU 
market. This is the case with the IUU Fishing Regulation,30 the Timber Regulation31 and 
the Ship Recycling Regulation.32 Under the IUU Fishing Regulation, access of fishing ves-
sels to EU ports is subject to authorisation, including an obligation to have a catch certif-
icate on board the fishing vessel,33 which has been validated by an eligible flag state.34 
 
25 R. HOWSE, D. REGAN, The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 'Unilateralism' in 
Trade Policy, in European Journal of International Law, 2000, p. 249 et seq.  
26 A. BRADFORD, The Brussels Effect, in Northwestern University Law Review, 2012, p. 1 et seq.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 J. SCOTT, EU Global Action on Climate Change: Contingent Unilateralism and Regulatory Penalty Defaults, 
in SADC Law Journal, 2012, p. 1 et seq. 
30 Regulation 1005/2008, cit. 
31 Regulation 995/2010, cit. 
32 Regulation 1257/2013, cit.  
33 Arts 7, para. 1, and 12 of Regulation 1005/2008, cit. 
34 Ibid., Arts 12, para. 2, and 20.  
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The IUU Regulation contains far-reaching enforcement measures for excluding illegal 
fishery products from the EU market35 and ensuring direct compliance both by TC indi-
vidual fishing vessels and by flag states. On the one hand, fishing vessels can be includ-
ed in the Community IUU vessel list when there is information about the vessel engag-
ing in IUU fishing and the flag state fails to investigate and take enforcement measures 
against it.36 On the other hand, flag states that fail to take action to prevent, deter and 
eliminate IUU fishing may be identified as non-cooperating countries whose products 
and catch certificates are not accepted in the EU market.37  
Mandatory conditions for access to the EU market take a different form under the 
Timber Regulation, which imposes a due diligence obligation on operators placing tim-
ber on the EU market for the first time.38 Operators are required to provide information 
on the imported timber,39 carry out a risk assessment evaluating the risk of illegal tim-
ber in their supply chain40 and take risk mitigation steps when the risk of illegality is 
found to be non-negligible.41 Notably, the Timber Regulation sometimes directly impos-
es these obligations on non-EU actors when they place timber on the EU market for the 
first time. Even in situations where non-EU suppliers are not the ones placing timber on 
the EU market, the Regulation requires them to provide information about their har-
vesting processes to the operator.42  
Mandatory restrictions to trade are also imposed in export measures. The Ship Re-
cycling Regulation requires ship recycling facilities to apply to be included in the “Euro-
pean list” in order to be able to recycle ships flying the flag of an EU Member State.43 In 
this way, it imposes direct obligations on TC facilities regarding safe and environmental-
ly sound ship recycling if they want to receive EU ships. The Commission authorises fa-
cilities to be included in the European list in implementing legislation on the basis of 
technical requirements set out in the Ship Recycling Regulation, and further spelled out 
in post-legislative Commission guidance, and following site inspections.44 Although the 
primary aim of export waste treatment standards is to ensure that EU ships are not re-
cycled in facilities with lower standards, their operation can influence TC practices more 
 
35 Products not accompanied by catch certificates will be refused importation: ibid., Art. 18. 
36 Art. 27 of Regulation 1005/2008, cit. 
37 Ibid., Arts 31, 33, and 38. 
38 Art. 6 of Regulation 995/2010, cit. 
39 Ibid., Art. 6, para. 1, let. a). 
40 Ibid., Art. 6, para. 1, let. b).  
41 Ibid., Art. 6, para. 1, let. c).  
42 Ibid., Art. 6, para. 1, let. a). 
43 Art. 13 of Regulation 1257/13, cit.  
44 Communication COM(2016) 1900 from the Commission – Requirements and procedure for inclu-
sion of facilities located in third countries in the European List of ship recycling facilities – Technical guid-
ance note under Regulation (EU) 1257/2013. 
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generally. The technical and economic “non-divisibility”45 of standards, such as those 
relating to the design and construction of ship recycling facilities,46 could lead TC facili-
ties expanding EU standards to all ships received (“de facto Brussels effect”). This could 
lead to regulatory reforms in ship recycling countries (“de jure Brussels effect”) and 
prompt international developments. However, in practice, widespread “out-flagging” 
practices may result in EU ships circumventing EU regulatory requirements. 
Beyond mandatory conditions to trade, certain IEMEIs partially and indirectly restrict 
access to the EU market. Such IEMEIs do not entirely close the EU market to non-
complying TC products or operators, but reduce the incentives for EU operators to 
trade with non-complying products or operators. Examples of such legislation include 
the sustainability criteria for biofuels, which impose restrictions on the origin of biofuels 
from specific types of land and stipulate specific greenhouse gas emission savings.47 
Non-complying biofuels are not excluded from the EU market, but compliance is re-
quired for energy from biofuels to count towards the target for biofuel use in transport, 
and for EU operators to be eligible for funding for consumption of biofuels.48 Similarly, 
electrical and electronic equipment waste shipped from the EU to TC facilities should be 
treated in conditions that “are equivalent to the requirements of the Directive”49 in or-
der for it to count towards the recovery targets imposed on EU Member States.50 Equiv-
alent conditions are to be determined on the basis of criteria set by the Commission in 
delegated acts.51 Recovery targets reduce the incentives for EU exporters to export 
waste to facilities that do not meet equivalent standards. Although indirectly restricting 
the EU market, these IEMEIs function on the basis of a similar logic to mandatory mar-
ket access conditions and can have similar impacts beyond EU borders.  
ii.3. Compliance with IEMEIs: “contingent unilateralism”, equivalence 
and flexibility 
In incentivising regulatory changes abroad, IEMEIs often render application of EU legis-
lation to TCs “contingent” upon legal developments abroad,52 thus implicating TC govern-
ments, qualifying the unilateral nature of the EU’s action, and alleviating the trade-
 
45 A. BRADFORD, The Brussels Effect, cit., p. 17 (non-divisibility occurs when “the exporter has an incen-
tive to adopt a global standard whenever its production or conduct is non-divisible across different mar-
kets or when the benefits of a uniform standard due to scale economies exceed the costs of forgoing 
lower production costs in less regulated markets”). 
46 Art. 13 of Regulation 1257/13, cit. 
47 Art. 17 of Directive 2009/28, cit. 
48 Ibid., Art. 17, para. 1. 
49 Art. 10, para. 2, of Directive 2012/19, cit.  
50 Ibid., Art. 11.  
51 Ibid., Art. 10, para. 3.  
52 J. SCOTT, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, cit., p. 87 et seq.  
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restrictiveness of IEMEIs through flexible compliance clauses. For example, the inclusion 
of aviation emissions in the EU ETS provided the possibility for revising the scheme in 
case an international agreement was reached.53 TC regimes were also initially implicat-
ed by providing the possibility for airlines departing from countries with legislation re-
ducing the climate change impact of flights to be exempted from the EU ETS,54 requiring 
the Commission to ensure “optimal interaction” with TC measures with an equivalent 
environmental effect.55 The interaction between the EU’s unilateral measure with inter-
national action and TC regimes would have raised novel questions concerning the con-
siderable discretion given to the Commission in determining the “contingency” of EU 
action, which should have been determined in consultation with the relevant TC without 
much further direction. Notably, equivalence determinations by the Commission could 
be subject to judicial review by the CJEU, as demonstrated in the field of data protec-
tion.56 In response to an overwhelmingly negative international reaction to the inclusion 
of aviation emissions in the EU ETS, the EU temporarily excluded international flights 
from the regime.57 The possibility that the application of the EU ETS to international 
flights might be resumed functioned as a “stick”58 in seeking a global agreement. Fol-
lowing the 2016 agreement on a global market-based mechanism in the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO),59 the Commission proposed that the current domes-
tic geographical scope of the EU ETS should continue, at least until 2020, to demon-
strate commitment to a global solution.60 It remains to be seen whether a “contingency” 
clause would be included in the application of the EU ETS, making its application contin-
gent on the implementation of the ICAO mechanism. 
A different kind of contingency manifests in the design of IEMEIs through equivalent 
requirements of environmental protection in TCs. Instead of exporting EU standards, this 
feature leaves room for discretion and variation of TC standards as long as they meet 
an equivalent level of protection. However, equivalence can have different meanings 
 
53 Art. 25a, para. 2, of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Oc-
tober 2003, establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community 
(consolidated version).  
54 Ibid., Art. 25a. 
55 Recital 17 of Directive 2008/101, cit.  
56 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 October 2015, case C-362/14, Schrems.  
57 Decision 377/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2013 derogating 
temporarily from Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community. 
58 V.L. BIRCHFIELD, Coercion with Kid Gloves? The European Union's Role in Shaping a Global Regulatory 
Framework for Aviation Emissions, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2015, p. 1276 et seq. 
59 ICAO, Resolution A39-3: Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and practices related 
to environmental protection–Global Market-based Measure (MBM) scheme, 2016, www.icao.int. 
60 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC to continue current limitations of scope for aviation activities and to prepare to im-
plement a global market-based measure from 2021, COM(2017) 54 final.  
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and is ultimately determined by the EU Commission. Apart from equivalence at country-
level, as illustrated in the Aviation Directive above, equivalence is imposed directly on 
TC economic operators, specifically within the export IEMEIs that impose conditions on 
how processes take place in TC facilities. As mentioned above, under the Directive on 
electrical and electronic waste, waste treatment in TC facilities should take place in 
equivalent conditions determined on the basis of criteria set by the Commission.61 Ad-
ditionally, the Ship Recycling Regulation requires TC facilities that receive EU ships to 
demonstrate that waste management facilities carry out waste recovery or disposal op-
erations in accordance with broadly equivalent human health and environmental 
standards, which are explicitly set out in Commission guidance.62  
In terms of compliance, other IEMEIs provide for alternative or supplementary 
routes for satisfying market access requirements that particularly influence compliance 
by TCs. These flexible compliance modes manifest in two ways. First, TCs can conclude 
bilateral agreements with the EU, such as the possibility to conclude a Voluntary Partner-
ship Agreement (VPA) under the Timber Regulation, which provides a “green lane” for 
access to the EU market.63 Despite incentives to conclude VPAs prior to the Timber 
Regulation, VPAs expanded only after the adoption of the Regulation restricting access 
to the EU market, showing the strong incentivising function of such trade-restrictive 
measures.64 On the one hand, VPAs are more cooperative in prompting legal develop-
ments abroad and incorporate greater involvement of TC local actors, including civil so-
ciety, in their formulation and implementation. On the other hand, there is minimal in-
formation about how the negotiating procedures of VPAs are to be carried out and 
there is no mechanism for appeal of suspension of negotiations.65 Their political nature 
may therefore hinder possibilities for TCs to challenge their formulation and application.  
Second, TC operators can use private certification and monitoring in complying with 
EU standards. For example, monitoring organisations established in the EU and recog-
nised by the Commission66 can be used as a supplementary route for complying with 
the Timber Regulation by providing due diligence systems.67 Additionally, producers of 
biofuels can verify compliance with the sustainability criteria through private voluntary 
 
61 Art. 10, para. 3, of Directive 2012/19, cit.  
62 Art. 15, para. 5, of Regulation 1257/13, cit.; Communication COM(2016) 1900, cit. 
63 Art. 3 of Regulation 995/2010, cit.  
64 C. OVERDEVEST, J. ZEITLIN, Assembling an Experimentalist Regime: Transnational Governance Interactions 
in the Forest Sector, in Regulation and Governance, 2014, p. 22 et seq.  
65 A. FISHMAN, K. OBIDZINSKI, European Union Timber Regulation: Is It Legal?, in Review of European, 
Comparative and International Environmental Law, 2014, p. 258 et seq. 
66 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 363/2012 of 23 February 2012 on the procedural rules for 
the recognition and withdrawal of recognition of monitoring organisations as provided for in Regulation 
(EU) 995/2010.  
67 Arts 4, para. 3, and 8 of Regulation 995/2010, cit. 
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certification schemes authorised by the Commission,68 in accordance with Commission 
guidance.69 The procedures for authorisation of certification schemes on the sustaina-
bility of biofuels have been criticised for lengthy delays, interference of third parties and 
general lack of transparency.70 Given the absence of clear provisions on the administra-
tion and selection of private certification schemes,71 a TC applicant would face difficul-
ties particularly in challenging the basis of a negative decision.  
Overall, flexibility and conditionality features exhibit a mixture of unilateralism and 
cooperation.72 Clauses linking to developments beyond EU borders are used in various 
ways: as negotiation tools, as incentives for concluding bilateral agreements and ad-
vancing international regimes, and as catalysts for the development of private regimes. 
They all contribute to creating a dynamic relationship between EU unilateral measures 
and legal developments in TCs. This mixture of unilateralism and cooperation is also 
reflected in the implementation of IEMEIs through different types of acts and in the 
ways in which market access conditions apply to TC actors, which ultimately determine 
their access to the EU market and to the EU legal order. In this respect, TC actors could 
seek to challenge different kinds of acts, including general regulatory acts as well as in-
dividually addressed EU acts that authorise operators and products. Importantly, de-
pending on the legal design of IEMEIs and their effects in TCs, it could also be the case 
that the TC affected actors would seek to challenge TC domestic law adopted in re-
sponse to IEMEIs.  
To conclude, this section has exposed some of the novel regulatory techniques em-
ployed in IEMEIs, which give rise to novel administrative acts and procedures as well as 
novel challenges for controlling EU global regulatory power. As internal measures, which 
pursue external action, IEMEIs blur the distinction between internal and external EU ac-
tion. As a mode of EU external environmental action, IEMEIs first operate within EU con-
stitutional and external relations law. Beyond conventional issues of EU external envi-
ronmental competence, concerning the delimitation of powers between the EU and the 
Member States and the EU’s international representation,73 IEMEIs implicate areas of 
EU law that have been less explored in relation to EU external action. Particularly, they 
 
68 Art. 18 of Directive 2009/28, cit. 
69 Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default values in the EU biofuels 
and bioliquids sustainability scheme, COM(2010) 160/01 (hereinafter, also Communication on voluntary 
schemes and default values). 
70 M. GAEBLER, Recognition of Private Sustainability Certification Systems for Public Regulation (Co-
Regulation): Lessons Learned from the EU Renewable Energy Directive, in C. SCHMITZ-HOFFMANN, M. SCHMIDT, B. 
HANSMANN, D. PALEKHOV (eds), Voluntary Standard Systems: A Contribution to Sustainable Development, Hei-
delberg: Springer, 2014. 
71 Ibid. 
72 J. SCOTT, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, cit., p. 114.  
73 G. MARIN-DURAN, E. MORGERA, Environmental Integration in the EU’s External Relations: Beyond 
Multlateral Dimensions, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, pp. 5-25. 
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raise “transnationalised” questions in EU administrative law about controlling the uni-
lateral exercise of global regulatory power and holding it to account in relation to TC 
impacts. In this respect, judicial review of IEMEIs and their implementing acts becomes 
particularly important in controlling how EU institutions exercise discretion and how 
procedural and substantive principles and rights under EU law apply to TC affected ac-
tors. The rest of this Article explores judicial review in the EU as a transnational ac-
countability avenue for IEMEIs by assessing the extent to which TC actors may have ac-
cess to justice in the EU legal order. As there is no special framework to determine the 
position of TC actors affected by EU domestic legislation, their position is determined by 
the application of mainstream EU law doctrines and procedures and how they apply to 
TC affected actors. 
III. Access to justice  
Judicial review is an important mechanism for holding regulatory power to account and 
upholding the rule of law.74 In developing doctrines and procedures that determine the 
legality of EU action, the CJEU’s role has been critical, particularly in relation to internal 
EU action. In relation to IEMEIs, it could be argued that, ideally, TC actors would be able 
to challenge their legality before an international court. However, there are limited op-
portunities for this, and these would not consist of challenges to IEMEIs on the basis of 
EU law, which constitutes the internal law of the regulating jurisdiction. Access of TC af-
fected actors to the EU judicial system is therefore important in holding EU institutions 
to account on the basis of the EU’s own rule of law.  
The extent to which TC actors can challenge IEMEIs in the EU legal order is partly 
determined by whether they can access EU courts and partly by the grounds of review, 
which can determine how TC interests may be protected as a matter of EU law. The dif-
ferent grounds of review under Art. 263 TFEU demonstrate how the external accounta-
bility gap could be filled through various procedural and substantive considerations of 
TC affected interests. IEMEIs could be challenged on the basis of competences, relating 
to the broad territorial scope and the unilateral nature of IEMEIs in pursuing environ-
mental protection goals. Competences in this sense, are usually interpreted broadly by 
the CJEU and tend to enable, rather than constrain, the adoption of IEMEIs, as long as 
there is a territorial link between the regulated activity and the EU.75 IEMEIs could also 
be challenged on the basis of essential procedural requirements, which can ensure pro-
cedural fairness for TC actors, particularly when IEMEIs are implemented through indi-
vidual decisions. Furthermore, substantially the effects of IEMEIs on TC actors could po-
tentially be reviewed under proportionality. However, the lack of a general requirement 
 
74 C. SCOTT, Accountability in the Regulatory State, in Journal of Law and Society, 2000, p. 38 et seq.  
75 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2011, case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America 
and Others (ATAA).  
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for equal treatment of TCs76 and the deferential review of EU complex policy decisions 
involving economic and political choices would likely result in a light review of TC ef-
fects. Finally, IEMEIs could potentially be challenged on the basis of infringement of 
fundamental rights of TC actors, particularly when certain rights are owed to “everyone” 
as a matter of EU law. However, it is still unclear how EU extraterritorial human rights 
obligations would arise in situations where EU domestic legislation, such as IEMEIs, 
have effects in TCs.77  
While both access to justice hurdles and the intensity of review by EU courts are 
equally relevant in assessing judicial review as a transnational accountability avenue for 
IEMEIs, the rest of this Article focuses on access to justice issues. Assessing the extent of 
an accountability gap and the position of TC actors in the EU legal order is particularly 
determined by the extent to which they can access EU courts, even before considering 
the grounds of review. In examining the extent to which TC actors can challenge the le-
gality and interpretation of IEMEIs within the EU legal order, this section explores: (1) 
the routes through which different kinds of TC litigants can have access to the EU judi-
cial system; (2) the conditions that determine whether litigants have locus standi to bring 
a case before EU courts; and (3) the Aarhus Convention,78 which is legally relevant for 
access to justice in environmental matters. It is also notable that, apart from general 
rules on access to justice in the EU, the legal design and effects of IEMEIs may deter-
mine whether IEMEIs can be challenged in the EU legal order on the basis of a reviewa-
ble EU act. Particularly in cases of “de jure Brussels effect”, where the TC may change its 
own regulation in response to EU standards, or when the EU measure defers to TC law, 
such as the Timber Regulation,79 it could be the case that it is domestic TC law that im-
poses obligations on TC actors, which cannot be challenged before EU courts.  
iii.1. Avenues for access to justice for different kinds of third country 
actors  
Depending on the legal design of IEMEIs, different kinds of TC actors may seek to chal-
lenge IEMEIs and related acts, ranging from TC individuals to TC governments. As a 
general rule, any natural or legal person can access EU courts80 and apply for annul-
ment of EU law under Art. 263, para. 4, TFEU irrespective of nationality, place of resi-
 
76 Court of Justice, judgment of 22 January 1976, case 55/75, Balkan-Import-Export, para. 14.  
77 D. AUGENSTEIN, The Human Rights Dimension of Environmental Protection in EU External Relations Post-
Lisbon, in E. MORGERA (ed.), The External Environmental Policy of the European Union: EU and International 
Law Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 263-286. 
78 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 337 (Aarhus Convention).  
79 Regulation 995/2010, cit. 
80 Art. 19, para. 3, TEU.  
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dence or registration.81 In fact, there are many examples of cases brought by TC natural 
or legal persons.82 The CJEU has not conclusively ruled whether this covers non-EU 
countries. However, it has implied that companies that constitute “emanations of the 
state” would have access to EU courts as there is no rule preventing them from doing so 
and denying them access would go against the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion.83 Therefore, in principle, TC actors, including TC governments, could apply to EU 
courts for annulment of IEMEIs or IEMEI-related acts. However, contrary to Member 
States that have privileged access to EU courts under Art. 263, para. 2, TFEU, TC gov-
ernments must satisfy the standing requirements under Art. 263, para. 4, TFEU, which 
as discussed in section III.2. are difficult to fulfil for both EU and non-EU affected actors.  
Apart from direct access to EU courts, TC actors could also challenge the validity 
and interpretation of IEMEIs through the preliminary reference procedure.84 Notably, 
foreign companies incorporated under national law in Member States can bring cases 
before national courts that could then be referred to the CJEU. This is particularly im-
portant as it would be unlikely for such companies to have standing before EU courts 
directly, as discussed below. This route has been employed in several cases, including in 
ATAA,85 where US airlines challenged the legality of the Aviation Directive before the 
High Court in the UK. However, at the same time, it would be unlikely for TC individuals 
to be able to bring a case before Member State courts and have access to EU courts 
through this route. Their access through the preliminary reference route is thus, in 
practice, more restrained in comparison with EU nationals. The access of TC actors 
through this route is thus easier for rich multinational corporations with registered of-
fices in the EU than it may be for weaker TC actors, such as smaller companies and indi-
vidual actors, particularly from developing countries. This demonstrates how “account-
ability in world politics is inextricably entangled with power relationships” and how 
weak actors are in a disadvantaged position to hold powerful actors to account.86  
Overall, TC individual actors face similar challenges in directly accessing EU courts 
as do EU actors,87 while their access to national courts may be more restricted. As for 
TC governments, their position, as non-privileged applicants, imposes additional limita-
tions for accessing EU courts, compared to access by Member States. This is due to 
strict standing requirements for non-privileged applicants. 
 
81 K. LENAERTS, I. MASELIS, K. GUTMAN, EU Procedural Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 316. 
82 For example, General Court, judgment of 25 October 2011, case T-262/10, Microban. 
83 Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter); General Court, 
judgment of 18 September 2015, case T-156/13, Petro Suisse.  
84 Art. 267 TFEU. 
85 ATAA, cit.  
86 R.W. GRANT, R.O. KEOHANE, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, in American Political 
Science Review, 2005, p. 29 et seq., p. 40.  
87 E. KORKEA-AHO, ‘Mr Smith Goes To Brussels’: Third Country Lobbying and the Making of EU Law and 
Policy, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 2016, p. 1 et seq. 
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iii.2. Standing  
Although standing requirements do not formally discriminate or delimit access on the 
basis of nationality or place of establishment, in practice TC applicants face difficulties 
in directly accessing EU courts. This is due to the restrictive interpretation of standing as 
well as different features of the legal design of IEMEIs discussed in section II, including 
whether IEMEIs impose direct obligations on TC actors and whether it is the EU act or 
TC act that could be challenged.  
In EU law terms, having established that TC actors are eligible to bring a case before 
EU courts, the next step concerns the admissibility of a case. In this respect, the regula-
tory design of IEMEIs may determine whether TC actors fulfil the standing requirements 
under EU law. According to Art. 263, para. 4, TFEU, “any natural or legal person may […] 
institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and 
individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to 
them and does not entail implementing measures”. 
The easiest way of accessing the courts is when a decision is addressed to a specific 
person as this right is granted unconditionally. Thus, in principle a decision addressed 
to a TC actor that is refused access to the EU market can be challenged before EU 
courts, irrespective of nationality. For example, a negative decision refusing to include a 
TC ship recycling facility on the European list, a decision rejecting a TC biofuels certifica-
tion scheme or a decision identifying a TC as a non-cooperating country under the IUU 
Fishing Regulation88 could potentially be challenged by the relevant TC actor.  
However, as most EU acts related to IEMEIs would not be individual acts addressed 
to a specific person, TC actors would usually have to satisfy the accompanying strict 
conditions of Art. 263, para. 4. In particular, the condition of “individual concern” has 
been narrowly construed by the CJEU. Standing is accorded only where a decision af-
fects applicants “[…] by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by 
reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons […]”.89 
This gives rise to restrictive access to affected interests, which in relation to environ-
mental matters are often represented by NGOs that would not satisfy this test.90 With 
respect to IEMEIs, TC operators, TCs or NGOs representing TC affected interests would 
usually not satisfy the “individual concern” test as they would not be distinguished by 
such special attributes. Nonetheless, at least some IEMEI decisions, such as the inclu-
 
88 For example, Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/889 of the Commission of 23 May 2017 identifying 
the Union of the Comoros as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregu-
lated fishing.  
89 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 July 1963, case C-26/52, Plaumann, para. 107.  
90 Court of Justice, judgment of 2 April 1998, case C-321/95, Greenpeace; L. KRÄMER, Environmental Jus-
tice in the European Court of Justice, in J. EBBESSON, P.N. OKOWA (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in Con-
text, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 195-210. 
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sion of a fishing vessel on the IUU vessel list, could be challenged on this basis given 
that such vessels are individually named under an implementing regulation.91  
The alternative Lisbon test for standing under Art. 263, para. 4, TFEU, according to 
which an applicant can challenge “a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them 
and does not entail implementing measures”, covers measures of general application. 
However, as interpreted, this test does not substantially expand the standing require-
ments. First, it only applies to regulatory acts, which exclude legislative acts.92 Second, 
these acts should not entail any implementing acts, which has also been interpreted 
narrowly.93 Once these two requirements are met however, regulatory acts that apply 
to objectively determined situations and produce legal effects with respect to categories 
of persons envisaged in general and in the abstract are covered.94 Importantly, the Lis-
bon test can lead to more extensive judicial review of non-legislative acts,95 which are 
often used in the implementation of IEMEIs, such as the delegated act on equivalent re-
quirements for treatment of electrical waste96 and implementing acts setting out the 
European list of ship recycling facilities.97  
An additional element of the standing requirements relevant for TC actors, which 
often practically limits their access to EU courts, is the interpretation of “direct concern”, 
specifically as applied by the General Court in Inuit I.98 The Inuit series of cases is partic-
ularly relevant for the analysis of IEMEIs because they are cases brought by TC actors 
affected by an EU measure which established a qualified import ban for hunted seals 
and seal products.99 In identifying whether the applicants were directly concerned, the 
General Court made a distinction between those applicants that were active in placing 
seal products on the EU market, whose legal position would be affected by the EU 
measure, and those applicants engaged in seal hunting outside the EU, whose econom-
ic position would be affected.100 The Court found direct concern only in relation to the 
former category. This legal point was not reviewed by the Court of Justice, which deter-
 
91 Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1852 of the Commission of 19 October 2016 amending Regu-
lation (EU) 468/2010 establishing the EU list of vessels engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated 
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92 General Court, order of 6 September 2011, case T-18/10, Inuit (hereinafter, Inuit I). 
93 General Court, order of 4 June 2012, case T-381/11, Eurofer.  
94 Microban, cit. 
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bon Treaty, in European Journal of Risk Regulation, 2012, p. 115 et seq.  
96 Art. 10, para. 3, of Directive 2012/19, cit.  
97 Art. 16, para. 1, of Regulation 1257/2013, cit. 
98 Inuit I, order of 6 September 2011, cit. 
99 Regulation (EC) 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
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100 Inuit I, order of 6 September 2011, cit., para. 75.  
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mined that the measure was not a regulatory act and that the applicants lacked individ-
ual concern.101 
This distinction can be important for TC actors affected by IEMEIs when they are not 
directly involved in placing products in the EU market but rather are indirectly affected 
by requirements imposed on processes abroad, which is often the case.102 For example, 
the Timber Regulation places due diligence obligations on operators who place timber 
on the EU market and that indirectly affect harvesters of timber. Although there may be 
situations where “the operator” under the Regulation will be the non-EU entity, in most 
transactions the “operator” will be the EU entity importing the timber.103 In this case, TC 
harvesters could instead potentially challenge TC standards determining legally har-
vested timber under TC law, on the basis of which the Timber Regulation and VPAs ap-
ply, before TC courts. However, given that timber producing countries are often devel-
oping countries with less established legal and judicial systems, affected actors may 
face other kinds of hurdles in challenging timber regulation in TCs. Generally, when ob-
ligations are imposed on a different level of the supply chain, TC operators cannot chal-
lenge IEMEIs, even if they are directly economically affected and possibly also indirectly 
legally affected. Indirectly affected TC actors may instead resort to external review 
mechanisms under the WTO, as TCs did in relation to the Seals Regulation.104 However, 
review of IEMEIs before the WTO dispute settlement system does not provide opportu-
nities for challenging IEMEIs on the basis of the legal system from which they originate. 
Additionally, WTO rulings lack direct effect in the EU,105 thereby restricting their disci-
plining function with respect to IEMEIs.  
Apart from the standing requirements discussed above, EU courts have developed 
a rights-based approach to a participation exception,106 which could provide an alterna-
tive avenue for TC actors directly accessing EU courts. This allows those with a legally 
recognised right of participation to challenge its application.107 However, when recog-
nised participation rights do not exist, this avenue of standing would not be available by 
general consultation with TC actors in the formulation of IEMEIs, for example in impact 
assessments. Recognised participation rights, particularly in the form of a right to be 
heard, may be explicitly provided in secondary legislation or arise as general principles 
of law. For example, in the context of IEMEIs, a right to be heard is specifically provided 
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in the IUU Regulation when an adverse decision is taken against a TC fishing vessel108 or 
a TC flag state.109 As a general principle however, a right to be heard is recognised only 
in limited circumstances. For example, it is recognised in relation to individual measures 
adversely affecting a person110 but it does not, however, extend to legislative measures, 
or acts of general application.111 In the context of IEMEIs, a right to be heard could po-
tentially apply when a TC facility applies to be included in the European list of ship recy-
cling facilities.112 The ship recycling facility would be under investigation, including 
through site inspections. However, it is not clear whether a right to be heard would ap-
ply in the absence of an explicit right given that authorisation of facilities is done on the 
basis of general conditions, and the European List is set out in implementing legislation 
that lists all authorised facilities. A right to be heard could arise at different stages of 
implementation of the Ship Recycling Regulation. The Commission’s guidance provides 
for TC facilities the opportunity to present their case and answer the Commission’s 
questions when the Commission considers removing a facility from the European list.113 
Although this is provided in a non-legally binding instrument, such a right would likely 
apply as a general principle given that removing a facility from the list would be set out 
in an individual decision or administrative act. In any case, when standing is established 
on the basis of legally recognised participation rights, the applicant cannot challenge 
the substantive content of a decision,114 but rather they must show that they would 
have been in a better position to ensure their defence if they had been given the oppor-
tunity to be heard.115  
Overall, direct access to EU courts is restricted. This is despite a right to effective ju-
dicial protection under the Charter.116 As the Court of Justice has emphasised, the com-
plete system of legal remedies of the EU consists of a combination of direct action be-
fore EU courts as well as judicial review in national courts and references for prelimi-
nary rulings.117 The shortcomings of providing a full system of judicial protection 
through the preliminary references route have been repeatedly identified, both by the 
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judiciary118 and by academia.119 These shortcomings are equally true, or perhaps even 
more so, in relation to judicial protection of TC interests when domestic measures, such 
as IEMEIs, are designed to extend beyond EU borders. TC actors may not have easy ac-
cess to national courts; their review can raise political issues affecting EU external rela-
tions; and their varying review by national courts can affect the effectiveness of the 
harmonisation of common European environmental standards that determine access 
to the European single market. For these reasons, consideration of TC impacts should 
preferably be determined by EU courts rather than national courts, because access to na-
tional courts may favour some kinds of privileged TC actors while excluding weaker ones.  
The alternative routes for access to the EU judicial system do not necessarily com-
pensate for the restrictive approach to standing for direct access to EU courts. This was 
recently highlighted by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) in review-
ing the compliance of the EU with its obligations under the Aarhus Convention,120 which 
is also legally relevant when examining the possibilities for access to justice in environ-
mental matters.  
iii.3. The Aarhus Convention and access to justice  
While there is scepticism as to whether the Aarhus Convention (the Convention) has 
had a real impact in the EU in terms of accountability and transparency,121 its imple-
mentation in the EU legal order is significant for the inquiry of this special issue into the 
crossroads of EU administrative law and external relations in three ways. These relate 
to how an international agreement can create new substantive and procedural rules 
and principles within the EU legal order; how these rules and principles can develop 
through the oversight of external compliance bodies; and how ensuring access to jus-
tice in accordance with the Aarhus Convention could expand judicial review as a trans-
national accountability avenue by broadening the personal scope of procedural rights 
to non-EU actors.  
The Aarhus Convention is legally relevant for IEMEIs particularly in terms of access 
to justice and access to environmental information. Notably, its provisions do not dis-
criminate on the basis of nationality in terms of who can access the Convention’s rights 
and could thus be relied upon by TC actors. In the context of access to EU courts, the 
third pillar of the Aarhus Convention on access to justice is particularly relevant. This 
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relevance lies in the international commitments of the EU under Art. 9 of the Conven-
tion, and in its implementation in EU law, demonstrating how the external accountabil-
ity gap could be filled through the implementation of an international agreement in the 
EU legal order.  
Depending on the kind of act that applicants seek to challenge, different standing 
requirements apply in the Aarhus context. In relation to a negative decision for access 
to information, applicants can ask for a re-examination of their request following which 
they can challenge a negative decision before EU courts.122 In relation to IEMEIs and ex-
ternal accountability, it is notable that the first pillar of the Aarhus Convention – that is, 
access to environmental information – extends to any person in the world.123 This is 
notwithstanding the formulation of access to documents and information under Art. 15, 
para. 3, TFEU and Art. 42 of the Charter, which provide for access to information for 
“any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its regis-
tered office in a Member State”. The Aarhus Regulation124 provides that request for ac-
cess to environmental information under the Transparency Regulation,125 which is also 
limited in scope, applies without discrimination as to citizenship, nationality, domicile or 
where legal persons have their registered seats or effective centre of activities.126 A 
combined reading of the Aarhus and Transparency Regulations covers persons from 
non-signatory states to the Aarhus Convention, enabling TC actors to require the disclo-
sure of information based on which IEMEIs are adopted and applied, as well as provid-
ing the possibility to institute court proceedings in cases where access to information is 
refused. For example, TC actors could require information and challenge refusals of ac-
cess regarding the basis of default values for biofuels, which can be used to more easily 
prove compliance with specific sustainability criteria127 or the bases on which the crite-
ria for equivalent treatment of electrical waste are determined.128 
Importantly, “environmental information” is a broad concept that includes any 
measures likely to affect environmental factors as well as cost benefit and other eco-
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nomic analyses and assumptions used within the framework of measures and poli-
cies.129 For example, in the context of IEMEIs, environmental NGOs brought a case 
against the Commission for failure to provide access to information about the authori-
sation of biofuels voluntary certification schemes.130 Particularly, this information also 
related to effects in TCs in terms of food prices and effects on the environment, which 
the Commission is specifically required to monitor under the Renewable Energy Di-
rective,131 and which TC actors may also wish to challenge. Recently, information relat-
ing to the environment was interpreted to include foreseeable emissions into the envi-
ronment132 which can be particularly relevant for IEMEIs relating to climate change. 
Beyond access to information, the Aarhus Convention and its implementation in the 
EU provide for access to justice in relation to “acts or omissions relating to the environ-
ment”. Art. 9, para. 3, of the Aarhus Convention requires signatories to ensure that the 
public has access to “administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts or omis-
sions by […] public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to 
the environment”. This includes a caveat that contracting parties can lay down any crite-
ria that will determine access to justice. While the implementation of Aarhus access to 
justice requirements at first sight seem promising, implementing legislation has been 
construed and interpreted narrowly, considerably limiting this accountability avenue. 
In complying with Art. 9, para. 3, the EU established a procedure to apply for an in-
ternal review of an administrative act or alleged omission in relation to environmental 
law under the Aarhus Regulation.133 This procedure is limited in two important re-
spects. First, it can only be invoked on the basis of violation of EU environmental law.134 
Second, it is only open to a specific class of legal persons – NGOs established under na-
tional law of an EU Member State – whose primary objective is the promotion of envi-
ronmental protection.135 While the administrative review procedure provides a signifi-
cant avenue for social accountability by environmental NGOs, these limitations are im-
portant. The review does not extend to issues of procedural fairness that may have 
been circumvented and is not open to non-environmental NGOs such as trade unions, 
which may also be affected by such acts or omissions,136 or to other members of the 
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public.137 This can be particularly problematic in light of the EU’s commitment to sus-
tainable development138 and coherence among its different policies.139  
Furthermore, internal review is only available for “administrative acts” under envi-
ronmental law, thus excluding legislative acts adopted by ordinary legislative proce-
dure.140 “Administrative acts” include only measures of individual scope, excluding 
measures of general application,141 something that enables the Commission to refuse 
most requests for internal review. Even though the narrow scope of acts covered by the 
internal review has been challenged, the CJEU has avoided assessing the compatibility 
of Art. 10 of the Aarhus Regulation with Art. 9, para. 3, of the Aarhus Convention by 
holding that the Regulation is not meant to implement these provisions and that the 
Convention lacks direct effect in the EU legal order.142 Despite its narrow scope, this 
procedure allows for review of some transnational regulation, such as authorisations 
under the Regulation concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Re-
striction of Chemicals (REACH)143 or the authorisation of placing genetically modified 
organisms on the market,144 but may still be restrictive on the merits.145 On the basis of 
the current interpretation of the administrative review procedure, environmental NGOs 
could potentially challenge IEMEI-related decisions, such as the inclusion of a ship recy-
cling facility on the European list, if the implementing act is considered to be of individ-
ual scope, or the recognition of a biofuels sustainability certification scheme which is set 
out in individual implementing acts.146 However, in this respect, environmental NGOs 
could seek to challenge Commission decisions because of contravention of environ-
mental law, which in effect may be conflicting with TC economic or developmental in-
terests affected by IEMEIs. This demonstrates the various kinds of contradictory account-
ability claims that IEMEIs may raise from the perspective of internal and external interests.  
What is of particular interest in terms of access to justice, is the possibility for NGOs 
to challenge the process of internal review under the Aarhus Regulation before EU 
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courts,147 which could provide for a combination of social and legal accountability. Alt-
hough at first sight it may seem as if the standing requirements are relaxed, it is doubtful, 
however, whether this would amount to a full review of the legality of the act or instead 
be limited merely to review of the written reply provided under the Aarhus Regulation.148 
If the NGO wants to challenge the initial act or omission, it would likely have to qualify un-
der the normal standing rules,149 which as analysed above are restrictive for NGOs.  
The restricted nature of EU standing requirements has been repeatedly criticised by 
the ACCC, which oversees the implementation of the Aarhus Convention. In 2011, the 
ACCC noted that if EU courts continued with the same restrictive approach to standing, 
this would lead to a breach of the Convention’s access to justice provisions, unless ad-
ministrative review procedures compensated for the restrictive approach.150 In March 
2017, the Committee issued its final findings, holding that the post-Lisbon Art. 263, pa-
ra. 4, TFEU,151 the internal review procedure under the Aarhus Regulation152 and the 
CJEU’s case law discussed above,153 do not constitute a change in direction to the effect 
of bringing the EU in compliance with the Convention. While the ACCC findings are not 
legally binding, the EU has committed to international obligations under the Aarhus 
Convention and to comply with findings of the ACCC. In terms of accountability, there is 
at least some political pressure on the EU to comply with access to justice requirements 
to enable members of the public to have access to effective judicial redress. While it 
seems unlikely for standing requirements to be drastically expanded, designing and in-
terpreting Aarhus implementing legislation in accordance with the Aarhus Convention, 
possibly through more expansive administrative procedures, could extend access to 
justice in the EU legal order in some respects. It remains to be seen whether and how 
the EU will change its approach to be in line with the Aarhus Convention and what this 
would mean for access to justice for different kinds of TC actors.  
Overall, while TC actors have access to justice through several avenues in the EU legal 
order, in practice direct access of TC affected interests to EU courts is restricted. This calls 
into question whether judicial review in the EU provides sufficient ways to hold EU global 
regulatory power into account, rendering it an imperfect accountability avenue for IEMEIs. 
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IV. Conclusion  
Territorial extension through IEMEIs blurs the distinction between internal and external 
EU action, with IEMEIs simultaneously regulating the internal market and catalysing de-
velopments outside EU borders by regulating conduct abroad. Given the uncertain na-
ture of accountability relationships between the EU as the regulating jurisdiction and TC 
interests affected by its action, this phenomenon gives rise to complex questions about 
controlling the exercise of EU global regulatory power.  
With the unilateral exercise of EU global regulatory power proliferating, not only in 
environmental law, but in many policy areas, judicial review in the EU legal order has a 
significant role to play in holding EU regulatory power to account in relation to TC af-
fected interests. Judicial review in the EU has some disciplining potential in relation to 
IEMEIs by providing access to EU courts when TC actors are directly affected, through 
the preliminary rulings procedure, and when individual decisions are addressed to 
them. However, direct access by TC actors is restricted when they are affected by IEMEIs 
in indirect and general ways. The restricted access to EU courts exacerbates an external 
accountability gap when TC affected actors cannot judicially challenge IEMEIs on the ba-
sis of the home legal system of EU law. Further, while this Article has focused on access 
to justice in determining the disciplining potential of judicial review for controlling EU 
global regulatory power, the extent to which the disciplining potential of judicial control 
of IEMEIs is realised also depends on the grounds and intensity of review by EU courts. 
Research into the intensity of review on the basis of grounds such as proportionality 
and fundamental rights in relation to TC effects can also help determine the extent to 
which legal accountability through judicial review contributes to addressing an external 
accountability gap related to IEMEIs. 
